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This paper seeks the optimal way of supervision of a single EU financial market. The 
reason for my research is that, based on the development of financial markets in recent years, 
the interconnection of markets, modern investment instruments and the strengthening of 
multinational financial groups allow for quick and easy transfer of capital and risk between 
countries and financial sectors. This forces us to reconsider the appropriateness of the 
currently used supervisory model. The paper analyzes models of home state supervisor in 
connection with supervision on a consolidated basis and supervision of financial 
conglomerates, the model of a lead supervisor and a single supervisor model with the unified 
structure and dual structure with the Union and national supervisory authorities. As the 
evaluation criteria were chosen costs for financial institutions, supervisory effectiveness, 
consumer confidence and political acceptability. The analysis concludes that the most 
appropriate model of supervision of a single financial market of the European Union is the 
model of a single supervisory authority with the unified structure. 
 
The work is divided into eight chapters to present reasons why the issue should be 
examined, analyzed possible solutions and evaluation of analysis. The first chapter describes 
the reasons why it is necessary to oversee a single financial market in the European Union. 
These are the integration of a single financial market of the European Union, achieved 
through the Financial Services Action Plan, and investment instruments for the transfer of 
credit, insurance and market risks allowing shift of significant financial risks between 
different financial sectors, entities within financial groups and between the states of the 
European Union. 
 
The second chapter sets out the objectives to determine the optimal supervisory model. 
It lists the interests of financial institutions, supervisors and consumers in the financial 
markets, the risks of integration and requirements, which a supervisory authority must comply 
with. In evaluating whether to use public or private oversight based on self-regulation, the 
paper concludes that, in light of historical developments in individual member states, the 
limited capacity of consumer organizations to protect consumer interests in the financial 
market and the limited enforcement of law in some member states, the most appropriate form 
is the public service model that will be supported to a limited extent by private organizations. 
At the end of the chapter, the evaluation criteria are set based on supervisory objectives and 
interests of participants: costs for financial institutions, supervisory effectiveness, consumer 
confidence and political acceptability. 
 
 The third chapter deals with the model of a home country supervisor, which is 
currently used to supervise the financial market in the European Union. The model is built on 
the premise that each service provider has its own home state, in which he obtained 
permission for its activities and which oversees its activities. This state is unique for each 
service provider. In contrast, the state in whose territory the service provider operates, either 
on the basis of the establishment, or simply cross-border provision of services without 
establishment, is the host state. This model opened up markets in individual member states to 
the regulated entities from other member states and triggered a genuine integration of 
financial services. Practical application of the model, however, brought problems in 
determining the scope of competences of the member states, the lack of harmonization of 
regulation and supervision at the local level, the need to communicate with several 
supervisors and the resultant costs, and the cross-border supervision of branches but not the 
subsidiaries. 
 
The home country supervisor model used on an individual basis is for supervision of 
financial groups supplemented by consolidated supervision of credit institutions, investment 
firms and insurance companies and supervision of financial conglomerates, which the fourth 
chapter deals with. The reason for the supplementary supervision is the contagion risk within 
a group, the group's exposure to counterparties, transparency, legal and management 
structures, monitoring the quality of the management, access to information for prudential 
supervision and moral hazard. Supplementary supervision has particularly the coordinating 
function for the supervision of entities in various states and does not substitute the supervision 
on an individual basis. 
 
The fifth chapter analyzes the model of a lead supervisor, which was introduced by 
market participants to eliminate the disadvantages of the home state supervisor model. It gives 
powers to oversee the entire financial group to an only supervisor, regardless whether entities 
are established on the territory of another member state through a branch or a subsidiary. 
Supervisory authorities in host countries are losing their supervisory powers, and only operate 
within the so-called college of supervisors, which serves as an advisory body to the lead 
supervisor and also works as a forum for information exchange. This model seems to be 
applied more widely in the future. 
 
Another possible solution is the model of a single supervisory authority for the entire 
European Union, further discussed in the sixth chapter. That would eliminate the 
disadvantages arising from the relationship between home and host state, strengthen the legal 
certainty for regulated entities, ensure the concentration of information on all subjects within 
a supervisory body and facilitate both the resolution of financial crises and negotiations with 
third parties. It can operate under a unified organizational structure where national supervisors 
would be branches roofed with Union headquarters or alternatively as a dual system where 
supervision is provided by both a single union supervisory authority and national supervisors. 
Supervised entities would be always supervised only by one authority, depending on whether 
they provide services across borders or not. Actually, overall application of this model meets 
resistance from member states; however, this model is going to be introduced for the 
supervision of credit rating agencies. 
 
The seventh chapter describes recent developments and changes in financial market 
supervision on the pan-European level. In response to the dramatic developments on financial 
markets in 2007 and 2008, a group of experts proposed a new system of EU financial market 
supervision which was subsequently adopted by EU institutions. There is a newly established 
authority for the supervision of systemic risk and three European supervisors divided 
according to sector principle. Nonetheless, new authorities are regulatory rather than 
supervisory in nature and their contribution should be mainly in the convergence of 
supervisory practices in member states. In this connection, many decisions of new authorities 
are binding and at the expense of national sovereignty. 
 
The content of the eighth chapter is to evaluate the analyzed models and to describe 
their possible risks for the Czech Republic. The thesis concludes that the highest possible 
effectiveness of supervision cannot be achieved by using more than one supervisor. Only 
when applying the model of a single supervisor with the unified structure no different 
supervisory approaches between authorities apply and there is no loss of efficiency due to the 
administrative burden of having to cooperate and exchange information. Moreover, this 
model delivers the lowest cost associated with supervision for regulated financial institutions. 
 
The tested models bring certain risk due to the structure of the financial market in the 
Czech Republic, where the dominant financial sector is the banking sector, in which 
approximately 98 % of the total assets is in hands of foreign owners, more than 90 % of 
which is from the Union. Therefore, introduction of the lead supervisor model would result to 
the loss of supervisory powers for more than 90 % of the systemically most important 
financial sector and the Czech Republic would participate in supervision solely as a member 
in a college of supervisors. In addition to this, given the differences in the systemic 
importance of the subsidiary in the Czech Republic and the parent company for a lead 
supervisor, the intensity of surveillance could be reduced and if the financial stability would 
be endangered interests of another Member State over the interests of the Czech Republic 
might prevail. The model of a single supervisor presents only a lower risk. Therefore, for the 
Czech Republic itself, disregarding its interest in the efficient functioning of the Union, may 
be worth keeping the current model of a home country supervisor, where the individual 
financial institutions in the Czech Republic are being supervised according to their 
importance for the Czech national economy, the impact of their failure for the state budget, 
guarantee schemes and lender of last resort. At the same time, it should continue the 
supervisory convergence and cooperation among supervisors in the Member States. 
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